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Sociology and the biological re-turn 
The crisis narrative evident within social science has led many to re- emphasise the materiality of the body 
and call for the forging of new alliances with the life sciences. Some have explicitly sought to utilize 
biological accounts as a more authoritative foundation upon which to ground theoretical claims (Massumi 
2002, Thrift 2007). Others have recommended realignment towards the intersection of the social and 
natural sciences with the aim of countering stagnation and reflecting new discoveries and preoccupations 
(Franks 2010, Christakis 2013).  More specifically, a number of sociologists are welcoming a new turn 
toward the social within the rapidly developing field of biology, identifying this as an opportunity for 
productive dialogue and collaboration (Rose 2013; Meloni 2013, 2014; Fitzgerald et al 2014, Fuller 2014). 
Such theorists trace the roots of sociology back to a 19th century appreciation of biology, portraying the two 
disciplines as ‘estranged twins’ (Fitzgerald 2014) with much to gain from a contemporary re-union.  
For example, Meloni (2013) hails a ‘postgenomic age’ in which nature / nurture divides are invalidated as 
part of an increasing socialisation of the biological. As he notes, ‘pro-social’ views are colonising 
evolutionary perspectives. Neuroscientists now study the social brain, while epigenetic research is 
revealing the social and environmental mediators of gene expression (Meloni 2013, 2014). In the words of 
Steve Fuller, interviewed after his keynote at the British Sociological Association  2014 Annual Conference, 
‘biology ain’t what it used to be1’. Meanwhile social theorists seeking to escape the conceptual dead end 
associated with the disembodied social constructionism are turning to the material foundations of the life 
sciences. Signs of a biosocial language are emerging in the social sciences (Meloni 2014) channelling a 
transcendent ‘hopeful ethos’ associated with new styles of thought in the life sciences. Rose and Abi-
Rached (2013) point to understandings of plasticity that now dominate neuroscience with the brain 
regarded as ‘optimizable’ and biology viewed in terms of possibilities rather than destiny. In refuting 
reductionism and determinism these new biologies are put forward as potentially radically transformative, 
providing the tools to challenge a hegemonic politics of the individual by offering new solutions for social 
betterment.  
Cross discipline collaboration is also urged by those seeking to revitalise the discipline. Sociologists, it is 
argued, have an important role in realising the ‘deeply progressive implications’ that could emerge when 
‘cosmopolitan and emancipatory forms of politics’ flow beyond the life sciences into policy (Fitzgerald et al 
2014). For Rose (2013) this entails ‘moving beyond description, commentary and critique, beyond the study 
of downstream implications of biology and biomedicine’ (23), to develop new affirmative relations. This 
requires transcending the horrifying legacy of eugenics to recognise that contemporary biopolitics now 
revolves around life rather than death, with new molecular understandings directed towards physical and 
mental enhancement (Rose 2007). To quote Fuller again:  
‘the thing that made eugenics so scary was the idea that this was a kind of esoteric form of 
knowledge that scientists, in collusion with the state might use to somehow mastermind getting rid 
of certain classes of people and introducing another class of people. We really don’t live in that 
kind of world anymore’2. 
                                                          
 
1 Quoted in Network Magazine, British Sociological Association Issue 117 (2014) p 18 
2 Quoted in Network Magazine, British Sociological Association Issue 117 (2014) p 18 
Accepted for publication by The Sociological Review on 12.3.16 
2 
 
 
Such confidence in 21st century biology might seem a tad misplaced to many in the context of global 
financial upheavals, political instability in Europe (including far right populism) and routine mass 
surveillance and biometric marking of populations. Nevertheless, this claim reflects a more general cultural 
and academic embrace of scientific innovations as paving the road to social progression (Rose 2007). For 
example, the Economic and Social Research Council have invested in birth cohort studies that collect 
biomarkers from participants3. They have also directed award funding toward epigenetics research, 
identifying it as a key emerging platform to assess health and social policy implications4, with educational 
neuroscience similarly promoted as an area most likely to deliver strategic priorities5. The biomedical 
research charity the Wellcome Trust appears to share this vision, allocating £6 million to develop 
neuroscience insights into classroom education. And while popular science writers and transhumanists 
speculate on the revolutionary potential of such approaches to address longstanding social problems (eg 
Doidge 2015; Fuller 2013; Carey 2012), the Big Lottery Fund has invested in an evaluation of early years 
services, including the collection of biomarkers from disadvantaged children to measure ‘epigenetic 
changes’6.  
In the midst of this enthusiasm for the biosocial we wish to sound a note of caution. Without doubting the 
relevance of a corporal material perspective or the potential for fruitful cross disciplinary collaboration, we 
call for a more critical consideration of the assumptions and politics underlying calls for sociologists to 
connect with a life sciences agenda. More specifically, we consider the repercussions for the ‘certain 
classes of people’ living under a contemporary ‘biopolitics of life’. Drawing in particular on the biologised 
policy trope of early years intervention, we show how biosocial visions tend to solidify and make normative 
specific relational practices and behaviours. The shift from the selfish gene to the social brain has been 
characterised by new understandings of homo-economicus as socially incubated, reinforcing gendered, 
classed and racialized accounts of family competence and individual value. Building on this analysis we 
question the role that sociologists might play in realising an emancipatory biosocial politics from within the 
grip of neoliberal moralisation of hope and self-transformation. 
 
Who’s social is it anyway? 
 
The social at the heart of sociological enquiry has always been subject to debate and contention. As many 
have noted social science instruments and techniques are constitutive, bringing the object of study into 
view, categorising and shaping how it is thought about and known (Osborne et al 2006; Law and Urry 
2004). This politics of method framed the development of classical sociology, the institutionalisation of the 
discipline in the context of the post war settlement and more recently an existential questioning of the 
purpose and function of social science in a new age of social data availability (Savage and Burrows 2007, 
2009, 2014; Osborne et al 2008). In this context the observation that biologists are discovering and 
increasingly incorporating an understanding of the social necessarily prompts the question what kind of 
social? As biosocial advocates acknowledge, the social currently reanimating the life sciences bears little 
resemblance to anything sociologists might recognise. For example, Fitzgerald and Callard (2014) describe 
                                                          
 
3 For instance the studies brought together under the ‘Closer’ initiative http://www.closer.ac.uk/about/, as well as 
the ill-fated ‘Lifestudy’ http://www.lifestudy.ac.uk/homepage 
4 ESRC-BBSRC joint research call on Epigenetics 2014/15 http://www.esrc.ac.uk/funding-and-guidance/funding-
opportunities/32152/esrcbbsrc-joint-research-call-on-epigenetics-201415.aspx 
5 See Review of Strategic Priorities http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/mission-strategy-priorities/refining-
priorities/index.aspx 
6 See A Better Start From competition to collaboration: key messages 
https://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/betterstart 
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their ‘painful awareness’ that the social invoked is a ‘rather mangy-looking beast – an animal quite alien to 
the rich and fat understanding of a century-old anthropology or sociology’ (6). 
 
More relevant still, the limited social province of the biological is assembled as a natural, apolitical space, 
with little consideration of the normative interpretations producing it. Sociologists familiar with Bourdieu’s 
‘construction of the object’ well recognise social knowledge as drawn from already existing frameworks of 
historically, culturally and politically specific meaning (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). But biologists 
working at the level of the molecular are less prone to question the normative contentions shaping scientific 
agendas and interpretations of findings.  For example, much of the enthusiasm generated in relation to the 
rapidly growing field of behavioural epigenetics revolves around Michael Meaney’s work on the ‘mothering’ 
practices of rats. Meaney has demonstrated epigenetic differences in gene expression between rat pups 
who were licked and groomed frequently by their mothers and those that were not, and has provided 
evidence that such mutations and ‘mothering behaviour’ are inherited by subsequent offspring.   
While behavioural epigenetic findings have been subject to much discussion and critique7 , scientists have 
scaled up findings about rat ‘mothering’ and gene profile to the human world (eg Monk et al 2012, 
McGowan and Szyf  2010). Indeed, Meaney himself applies his research to disadvantaged children, 
stating:  
Our research has identified a key, early environmental factor which produces enduring biological 
changes in brain development and changes in behaviour that are crucial to lifetime outcomes. We 
have found that the biological process is potentially reversible, holding out considerable hope that 
children’s lives can be dramatically improved through well-targeted supports. Our findings suggest 
that social policy could soon be on a par with general medicine in being able to structure help that 
is appropriate to the needs, biology and responsiveness of each child. (Meaney 2014, 
unpaginated) 
Leaving aside the technical complexities informing this debate, the core focus of the research inevitably 
builds on and reinforces deeply engrained ideas about cycles of deprivation and the culpability of mothers.  
Maternal behaviour is commonly positioned at the interface of the social and biological, reflecting not only 
gendered assumptions but also a set of late modern contentions about parenting as profoundly formative of 
individual life chances. This is notwithstanding the pragmatic concentration on the interpersonal within 
biosocial research ‘because that is all the sociality that can enter the experimenters’ purview’ (Rose and 
Abi Rached 2013, 159). 
It is worth noting at this point that controversies around epigenetics rage with many scientists decrying the 
‘hype’ surrounding the field (Juengstemail 2014). Pickersgill et al (2013) note the uncertainty and 
ambivalence characterising epigenetic debates, pointing to the way ‘tentative “coulds” and hopeful “mays” 
commonly steer these narratives’ (434). The neurogeneticist, Kevin Mitchell (2014) is less equivocal in his 
assessment of murine epigenetic findings, critiquing much of the science and mocking their implications. 
Evolution appears to have made us mammals very delicate creatures. If you look sideways at a 
mouse these days you can permanently alter its genes, it seems, along with those of its kids and 
grandkids. Of course, you’d think another look might change them back if they're so sensitive, but 
apparently not. 
                                                          
 
7 For example see The Trouble with Epignetics by Kevin Mitchell http://www.wiringthebrain.com/2014/04/the-
trouble-with-epigenetics-part-3.html 
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The scientific intricacies underpinning behavioural epigenetics continue to be extensively discussed 
alongside concerns about generalising to human behaviour. What tends to remain unquestioned in 
scientific circles though is the rationale structuring the focus on rat mothers and the social meanings implicit 
in such a focus. An invisible normative framework guides both the research and its critical reception. For 
example, an article published in the journal Science by Greg Miller (2010), provides a measured account of 
findings beyond the ‘seductive allure of behavioural epigenetics’. Yet Meaney’s work is addressed in the 
paper under the sub-heading, ‘The importance of a loving mother’. The subsequent discussion highlighting 
the scant evidence for translating epigenetic findings to humans is accompanied by a box of four images 
titled ‘Different upbringings’ (see Figure I) with the top two featuring photographs of rats feeding pups. In 
the second of these the rat mother looks away disinterestedly (or as disinterested as a rat can look). 
Underneath are contrasting images of rich and poor US neighbourhoods. The caption reads: 
Being raised by a nurturing (top left) or a lackadaisical (top right) mother can cause epigenetic 
differences that affect a rat pup’s behavior later in life. Whether similar differences occur in people 
raised in wealthy (bottom left) or impoverished (bottom right) neighbourhoods remains an open 
question. (25) 
Aside from the implicit biological universalism of emphasising the particular significance and accountability 
of mothers, the unproblematic conflation between impoverishment and so called ‘lacksadasical’ mothering 
effectively highlights how principles quickly become elided, assumptions naturalised and alternative 
explanations obscured. This tacit reasoning is further contextualised by the racialized make up of US 
neighbourhoods, cross cut by social class, which remains an unspoken backdrop to the discussion (e.g. 
Massey et al. 2009). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
As Bourdieu (1992) notes, research topics and discussions are trapped within pre-existing meanings in the 
absence of a reflexive sociology. Moreover, the social conceived of within the life sciences centres the 
(interpersonally embedded) individual, placing her at the centre of social problems and solutions. And the 
normative undercurrent within biosocial models is intensifying as a result of what Rose and Abi-Rached 
(2013) have termed the ‘translational imperative’; the pressure to satisfy funders by producing meaningful, 
applicable findings. This has seen an emphasis on identifying the biomarkers of child rearing, chiming 
neatly with a broader policy drive to personalise poverty, inequality and other social problems.  
As neurofeminist theorists Höppner and Schmitz (2014) contend:  
Within the current popular debate, what stands out in particular is the paradigm of individualization 
and self-responsibility in neoliberal society. Equal opportunities qua the optimization of brains are 
addressed in the sense of ‘everyone is his/her own fortune. (14).  
Humankind may now be envisaged as a socially adaptive species at the molecular level, but values, 
strengths and visions of progress are still relentlessly tied to a late capitalist ideology. To illuminate this 
point we draw on the example of early years intervention as a contemporary social policy tenet that is 
articulated and justified through the language of biology. As the social is routinely reduced to the 
interpersonal in the laboratory the ‘social problem’ is reduced to the level of the family in social policy. We 
begin by outlining how parenting and child development have come to be positioned at the core of new 
conceptions of the social, before highlighting the mechanisms through which the life sciences are funnelled 
through a neoliberal politics of the social. 
 
Foreclosing the social: neoliberalism and family 
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As Gane (2014) demonstrates, the trajectory of the economic liberalism that came to exert such global 
power and influence began in dialogue with early sociology and developed through an explicit critique of 
the notion of the social underpinning the discipline. Suspicion was cast upon claims that ‘society’ has any 
independent material existence beyond the statistics used to envisage it. From the perspective of Friedrich 
Von Hayek and other neoliberal pioneers, social scientists and the state conjured up a reified collective as 
part of a projection of socialist ideals (Davies 2013). Society, it was argued, has no agency and cannot be 
independently known except through market based choices of individuals. Much has been written by social 
theorists on the neoliberal project and its associated aversion toward collective social conceptualisations. 
However, far less attention has been focused on the fundamental but largely invisible role understandings 
of family as an indispensable and undeniably social concept have played in developing this political 
direction. 
 
Margaret Thatcher’s infamous statement that ‘there is no such thing as society…. There are individual men 
and women, and there are families8’, reflected both the moral anxieties of those on the political right but 
also the undeniable interdependencies of individuals particularly towards the beginning and end of life. 
Even the most ardent individualist cannot transcend the inevitability of human frailty. More pertinent to this 
argument, human beings are not born ‘entrepreneurs of the self’ but must be made into self-governing 
entities within the social realm of family. This recognition has profoundly shaped neoliberal reconfigurations 
of the state and society, and can be traced right through into the narrow and anaemic biological 
conceptions of the social operationalised within the laboratory. As Rose and Abi-Rached (2013) 
acknowledge broad arrays of childhood interactions are routinely scaled down to the level of interpersonal 
primary caregiver relations, with ‘the social’ reduced to the common denominator of mother--child 
interactions. 
While Thatcher was vocal about the importance of ‘the family’, the traditional values she and others on the 
political right lauded during the 1970s and 80s reflected and reproduced an old capitalist order. The 
manifest gender hierarchy and oppression underpinning embedded liberal ideals of the nuclear family ill 
fitted the rhetoric of individual freedom and liberation proselytized through the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ 
(Boltanski and Chiapello 2005).  Nancy Fraser (2009) makes a salutary point for those extolling the 
biosocial when she argues that feminist emancipatory ideals and critiques of ‘the family’ were appropriated 
and made mainstream, achieving very different political ends from those intended. The concept of the 
personal as political increasingly became articulated as the personal is the only political, enforced through 
promotion of the self-determining, networked individual, liberated from gendered and classed expectations 
and ties. 
A reconstructed ideology of family, better suited to these advanced capitalist sensibilities, emerged as free 
market economists developed the theory of human capital and applied the principles of rational behaviour 
to family. Most notably, Becker (1981) conceived of families as ‘small factories’ (964) producing children 
and other commodities (including health and prestige). From this perspective families are held together not 
by obligation or sentiment but by mutual interest. Children are raised as a venture opportunity and become 
the core focus of production. Although widely critiqued at the time, Becker’s conception of human capital as 
an output of family laid the foundations for a social investment model of policy, subsequently aggressively 
pursued through the targeting of parenting under the rubric of early years intervention. As such, Becker’s 
representation of families as rational choice driven units shifted over time from a description of how the 
world worked to a morally charged necessity requiring state enforcement. 
                                                          
 
8 1987 Sep 23 Interview for Woman's Own ("no such thing as society") 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689 
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In the context of increasing diversity (rising rates of divorce, cohabitation, birth outside of marriage and 
same sex parenting) administrative and policy definitions of family became more flexible and inclusive, but 
crucially through a centring of childrearing as the primary moral concern. The replacement of male 
breadwinner models of family with norms around dual earning households was promoted as the 
progressive solution to gender injustice. At the same time the female dominated practice of childcare was 
redrawn as a motor of meritocracy, moving conceptualisations of family away from traditional structural 
associations with class bound trajectories. Instead family was hailed as the formative site through which 
competent personhood is cultivated, with well parented children better able to navigate and capitalise on 
new post-industrial economic landscapes (Gillies 2014).  Concerns about the social fabric were largely 
condensed down to the interpersonal level of parenting, with a focus on risk reduction through ‘early 
intervention’ eclipsing established welfare state principles of need and mutual obligation.  
By the end of the 20th century childhood investment was being touted as a prescription for a range of social 
ills. The US Nobel Laureate economist James Heckman (2000) has played a particularly influential role in 
normalising a rationale for targeting intervention at the very young. Arguing that human capital is 
cumulative rather than fixed, Heckman and colleagues proposed a formula summed up in the phrase ‘skills 
beget skills and abilities beget abilities’ (Cunha and Heckman, 2007). This economic reasoning, known as 
the ‘Heckman equation’, asserted that return on human capital was very high in the early years of life and 
diminished rapidly thereafter. A re-inscription of family from institution to contingent manufacturing hub 
followed. Traditionally positioned as outside the remit of state involvement in all but extreme circumstances 
family came to assume significance as a key vehicle for social policy intervention.  
Previous state preoccupations with family values and strengthening the nuclear family as a moral bedrock 
were largely replaced by an instrumental focus on ‘parenting’ and ‘child outcomes’. In this new political and 
cultural landscape understandings of inequality, poverty, crime and disorder are increasingly filtered 
through the lens of bad parenting, with poor families targeted under the auspices of reducing child poverty, 
crime and anti-social behaviour. The hegemony of this paradigm was particularly evident in the then 
Government’s interpretation of the 2011 English riots as a crisis in parenting skills, with this thesis forming 
the centrepiece of a policy ‘fightback9’. Promises that parenting support would be ‘accelerated, expanded 
and implemented as quickly as possible’ were pursued through an extension of ‘Family Nurse Partnerships’ 
(a home visiting service for disadvantaged pregnant mothers) and the setting up of a ‘troubled families 
taskforce’ (Edwards and Gillies 2016). 
The notion that family intervention can inoculate against irrationality and personal pathology has similarly 
gained traction and credibility in academic circles, most notably through the rise of ‘prevention science’ (eg. 
see Catalano 2010). This multidisciplinary effort to alter the ‘trajectories of poor lifestyle decisions’ 
commonly locate the precursors of dysfunction in early family life. Significantly, while animal behaviour is 
anthropomorphised to convey the policy implications of epigenetic generating rat ‘mothering’ practices, the 
humanising language of family virtually disappears in prevention science with mothers depicted instead as 
‘primary socialisation agents’. ‘Intervention targets’ are recommended on the grounds that ‘optimal 
socialisation leads to informed decisions regarding acceptable behaviour when confronted with verbal, 
behavioural, emotional and environmental cues’ (Petras and Sloboda 2014; 257). More broadly then, 
parenting has come to substitute for discussions of the social, often as a proxy for social class through the 
ready conflation of poor parenting with poor living standards. 
 
                                                          
 
9  David Cameron’s ‘Social Fightback’ Speech 15th August 2011 
 http://www.politics.co.uk/comment-analysis/2011/08/15/cameron-fight-back-speech-in-full 
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Parenting: and the new ‘social’:  
 
As 21st century understandings of family see an emphasis on human capital production through the 
language of parenting proficiency, a distinctive form of neoliberal paternalism has begun to take root. The 
rise of psychologically inflected accounts of economic theory and appropriation of the arena of 
interpersonal relationships to conceptualise and manage socially embedded individuals has been widely 
discussed (Jones et al 2013; Davies 2015). In particular, burgeoning fields of neuroeconomics and 
behavioural economics have been explored in relation to an alignment of philosophical and political 
concerns termed ‘neurocapitalism’ (Pykett 2013). In the wake of the global financial crisis new attempts 
have been made to envisage and requisition the social as underpinning and supporting sensible behaviour 
and ‘good’ choices, marking a shift away from a rationale of maximising individual preference towards an 
evaluative agenda prioritising ‘good’ sustainable choices that promote the political equilibrium (Davies 
2012; Soss et al 2011).  
 
Yet while public policy has experimented with psychologised techniques of libertarian paternalism, for 
example through the UK Government’s commissioning of a ‘Behavioural Insights Team’ (Jones et al 2013) 
parenting remains the formative and largely uncontested medium through which the state is actively 
seeking to shape self-regulating, neoliberal subjects. The ‘soft paternalism’ associated with neurocapitalism 
calcifies into an authoritarian conviction when applied to the sphere of family justifying the monitoring, 
regulation and policing of disadvantaged mother’s in particular. This is evident through, for example the 
introduction of developmental checks for two year olds, a creeping formalisation of early years care as an 
educational space and the increasing use of legislation (including Parenting Orders) to enforce parental 
compliance. More starkly, family courts are now receiving record numbers of applications from statutory 
services to remove children from their parents (Puffet 2016), reflecting increasing concern about ‘cycles of 
deprivation’ perpetuated through family practices. 
 
With the social envisaged as a tool of self-optimization mastered in infancy childrearing becomes about 
‘action and skills acquisition rather than a complex web of relationships between adults, children and their 
communities’ (Hartas 2011;148). The effect is to intrumentalise the expression of love for children, with 
parents urged (and in many cases compelled) to carefully consider and plan how they might touch, 
maintain eye contact, talk and play with their children for maximum effect (McVarish 2014).  In developed 
economies across the world the minutia of everyday childrearing practice have been harnessed to a moral 
agenda, with practices like breastfeeding and pursuit of early home learning strategies promoted as 
aspirational actions that will maximise development and life chances (Faircloth et al 2013). Despite the 
responsibility for such practices predominantly falling on mothers, this automatic eliding of children’s best 
interests with the best interests of neoliberal regimes goes broadly unchallenged.  
 
The conviction that intensive family intervention in early childhood can improve prospects for the 
disadvantaged, and for whole nations, is most commonly justified through reference to the economic 
prediction associated with the Heckman equation. Indeed a graph showing projected ‘rates of return on 
investment in human capital by age’ has been widely reproduced in policy circles as if it were proof in itself 
of the model’s contentions (Howard-Jones et al 2012). But the inconveniently underwhelming empirical 
evidence base for the effectiveness of early years intervention (Hartas 2012; Bruer 2011; Rutter 2007) is 
now being leapfrogged for a seemingly more reliable and persuasive direction offered by the emerging 
biological accounts of ‘the social’, with particular interest centring on the childhood plasticity of the brain 
and the epigenetic potentiality of parenting. 
 
It is within this narrow and politically loaded context that biosocial explorations of how the environment ‘gets 
under the skin’ are developing, making for a somewhat ideologically sodden base upon which to pitch a 
big, cross disciplinary tent. As we will illustrate in more depth, the emergence of a broad and deep 
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consensus around the necessity of cultivating and augmenting children’s development in the name of the 
national good, generates as many moral objections as erstwhile eugenic projects. 
 
Early intervention and the optimal imperative 
In previous work we have demonstrated the extent to which policy and practice discourses of early 
intervention are now rooted in biological conceptions of neurodevelopment, and increasingly epigenetics 
(Edwards et al 2015, Edwards et al forthcoming). These conceptions resonate with and operationalise the 
hope filled ethos recognised by biosocial advocates. The genetic determinism and reductionism of the past 
are replaced by a conception of early years plasticity through the interaction of brain as biology and the 
social as parenting. Consequently, when a group of neuroscientists published findings suggesting that 
children from poor families have smaller brain surface areas compared with their more privileged peers, 
discussion among the science community and media focused on how this deficit could be addressed 
through intervention10. 
This is exemplary of the ‘somatic ethic’ Rose (2013) identifies as characteristic of the ‘new century of 
biological citizenship’. The social biological interpretations emerging from epigenetic and 
neurodevelopmental research carry an imperative to act on possibilities through which humanity could be 
transformed (Rose 2013). Yet reducing the shaping of human subjectivity and destiny down to the 
molecular level strips imperatives to intervene of the political dimensions that frame them as obligations. As 
we have intimated, the targets of the interventionist ethos are specific and socially patterned. When Rose 
and Abi-Rached state that ‘… we are now acquiring the obligation to take care of our brain – and the brains 
of our families and children – for the good of each and of all’ (2013, p. 223) their collective ‘we’ is issued in 
a context where ‘care’ is heavily gendered and the formative development of infant brains attributed almost 
entirely to mothers.  
The downstream policy and practice implications of such constructions are already profound. 
Contemporary family policy is riddled with unsupported contentions that the quality of early years care is 
reflected in the anatomical structure of a child’s neural circuits. For example, the Early Intervention 
Foundation (part funded by the ESRC as an official ‘What Works centre’) cites crime, poor education levels 
and job prospects and low quality of life, before suggesting ‘science tells us we may find the answer to 
these complex social problems in early childhood when the architecture of the brain begins to form’.11 The 
significance accorded to early nurturing and attachment in determining or preventing personal and societal 
dysfunction drives a range of family interventions delivered through pre- and post-natal care provision in 
poor communities. And as our previous research with practitioners has shown, a strong emphasis operates 
around the significance of breaking cycles of insensitive and insufficiently attentive parenting among the 
poor (Edwards et al 2015). 
This is achieved through targeting pregnant women and new mothers as the core mediators of their 
children’s development and subjecting them to parenting interventions designed to ‘optimise’ their 
children’s development. While couched in the gender neutral terminology of ‘parenting’, early intervention 
policies and services reflect an essentialist turn towards viewing good motherhood as biologically informed, 
with some scientists suggesting that mothers’ brains are re-programed during pregnancy to increase their 
emotional sensitivity (Kinsley and Franssen 2010; Pearson and Lightman 2009; Sandman and Glynn 
2009).  Concern also revolves around the disadvantaged mother’s brain as potentially producing too much 
                                                          
 
10 For example see Huffington Post, Study Reveals Sad Link Between Poverty And Children's Brain Development 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/30/brain-development-poverty_n_6968758.html 
 
11 See Brain Hero video http://www.eif.org.uk/what-is-ei/ 
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of the stress hormone cortisol and adversely affecting the neural development of the foetus. This plays out 
through appeals to pregnant mothers coping with poverty, housing insecurity and domestic violence, to 
better control their anxiety by considering what getting stressed might do to their baby ante and post natally 
(Edwards et al 2015). 
Such explicitly gendered and classed accounts of socially sculpted brains and genes highlight the need for 
sociologists to continue challenging and critiquing in any collaboration with life scientists. Just as ends did 
not justify means in more deterministic eras, normatively engrained assumptions are no less dangerous in 
the post genomic age. In this context a disciplinary move beyond the downstream of policy and practice 
risks being read as a retreat from the politics of the social toward the apparent blind objectivity of the 
molecular gaze. Adopting such a perspective could obscure configurations of domination and oppression 
beneath a progressive will to enhance the future and make a better world. Critical consideration of the 
values driving interventions are rendered redundant in an age where biological truth is seen to speak for 
itself. 
 
The logic of capital and the tyranny of hope 
 
It is from this critically embedded position that we take issue with the optimistic promises some are reading 
into biosocial synthesis. We also question the substance and meaning of the hope that is generated 
through such a somatic ethic. A non-deterministic commitment to opportunity rather than destiny has been 
broadly welcomed, with little consideration of the negative consequences this standpoint could unleash. As 
Rose and Novas (2007) suggest, the biological citizenship characterising contemporary regimes of the self 
generates ‘a moral economy of hope, in which ignorance, resignation and hopelessness in the face of the 
future is deprecated’(6). In the process individuals are forced into a relational dynamic that Lauren Berlant 
(2011) has described as ‘cruel optimism’. Biological and social limitations are overridden by attachments to 
damagingly unrealistic possibilities that carry a high psychic and social cost. Those caught within this 
dynamic struggle on toward the unattainable rather than resisting the regime, grinding themselves down in 
process. Thus, for the mother in the crosshairs of early intervention programs the careful adherence to 
optimal parenting is sold as a realisable future investment, bypassing the structural and social conditions 
that will almost inevitably seal her children’s fate. 
 
From this perspective, hope and its attendant practices (trying, persevering, managing disappointment) sit 
closer to oppression than freedom. Indeed it could be argued that a moral obligation to strive and self-
improve has intensified a merciless pressure on the poor, sick and vulnerable to personally overcome their 
predicaments. Acceptance of limited capacity and responsibility has been swept away with the determinism 
of the past placing new normative burdens on those least able to manage them. Aggressive welfare reform 
might be held up as another corollary of this biopolitics of life and its attendant tyranny of hope. Notoriously 
callous ‘fitness to work assessments’ stripping the severely disabled and even the terminally ill of Disability 
Living Allowance are born of a ‘hopeful’ asset based approach to public health12 (Friedli 2014). Biosocial 
research is being conducted against the backdrop of a mission to capitalise the self, with moral identity 
made contingent on the active demonstration of resilience and determination to progress, regardless of 
disadvantage or incapacitation. While no one is written off or rendered hopeless anymore, the concept of 
dependency is disavowed both as a subject position and a material condition.   
Consent and compulsion are blurred in this late capitalist vision, with hope as a value enforced through the 
subtle pressure of enablement. Those lacking a demonstrable desire to optimize and surmount structural 
                                                          
 
12 Concerns around new eugenic approaches are particularly acute in the field of disability studies. 
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and economic barriers are regarded as no less problematic than the low stock of old, but they are now 
increasingly targeted as culpable ‘skivers’. As our research with early intervention policy proponents and 
practitioners has underlined, a ‘hopeful ethos’ drives an almost evangelical faith in the power of good 
mothering to produce better brains (Edwards et al 2015). The strapline of the Family Nurse Partnership 
program declares they are ‘changing the world one baby at a time’. Meanwhile, a burdensome 
responsibility is transferred onto disadvantaged mothers to achieve the impossible and parent their children 
out of poverty. 
Given these developments we would argue that it is neither desirable nor possible to divorce cutting edge 
biosocial research from its downstream implications. It is at this more diffuse level where, through the 
centuries, abuses and cruelties have been enacted in the name of science. The consequences of the new 
biosocial styles of thought are no less brutal, with, for example, family court professionals now routinely 
consulting crude interpretations of neuroscience to assess whether parents are fit to raise their children 
(White and Wastel 2013). And from here it is only a small leap to imagine a future in which such biosocial 
‘knowledge’ is drawn on to determine reproductive rights, suggesting that we are considerably closer to the 
eugenic past than many are prepared to consider. 
 
Plasticity and the eugenic pull 
 
History of course never simply repeats itself. Instead old configurations and preoccupations become 
assembled in new ways, in this case rewritten through the optimism of plasticity and anti-determinism. 
Rather than acting as a crucial failsafe, routing the biologisation of social issues away from the disturbing 
reductive social engineering of the past, new scientific developments are being reinterpreted through long 
standing rationales and fixations. This argument is convincingly made by Mansfield and Guthman (2015) in 
relation to the promise of plasticity associated with epigenetics. As they explain, biological variation is 
foregrounded in this new science, but epigenetics moves beyond the infinite study of difference to search 
for causal mechanisms linking environmental exposures to bodily outcomes. As such, epigenetics centres 
on disruptions to ‘normal’, ‘natural’ states of development in examining how ‘oppression gets under the 
skin’. But although attention is shifted away from individual genes to collective, environmental causes, work 
is driven by a eugenic logic to ‘eliminate defects and purify life’ (Mansfield and Guthman 2015; 16). 
 
This highlights troubling continuities in biosocial theorising, particularly in terms of interpretations of impurity 
and deviation. As Mansfield and Guthman note, epigenetic science operates through heightened notions of 
abnormality, with environmental factors that modify gene function drawn on to explain a range of ‘disorders’ 
including obesity, antisocial behaviour, developmental delay, delinquency and reduced IQ. As with genetic 
determinism, epigenetics biologises this difference, applying normatively grounded categorisations of a 
superior normal verses inferior abnormal. From this perspective, the potential for current models of 
biosocial synthesis to generate new narratives of, and possibilities for social justice appear limited. The pull 
of an optimisation logic seems destined to replicate rather than contest gender and class reproduction. For 
example, when biological discourses around pregnancy and breastfeeding become ‘social’ they migrate 
toward centring accounts of the optimal female brain and ‘normal’ infant development, advocating family 
relationships that leave little scope for notions of gender plasticity. 
Similarly troubling connotations emerge from an epigenetic biopolitics of race. While some hail post 
genomic science as offering an anti-essentialist account of the located and transgenerational material 
injuries of race (Fitzgerald et al 2014; Kuzawa and Sweet 2007; Rose and Rabinow 2006), others point to 
the way such developments have worked to intensify racialization of populations. For example, Mansfield 
(2012) highlights US environmental health policies to limit methylmercury exposure through fish 
consumption as an illustration of the way race is reconstructed as plastic, yet embodied through the 
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practices of reproductive women. High fish intakes are perceived to pose a risk to the neurodevelopment of 
foetuses through epigenetic mechanisms, driving US regulatory agencies to issue advice to women of child 
bearing age. Such warnings work to position particular minority ethnic cultural dietary practices as deviating 
from ‘normal’ white consumption, responsiblizing and inscribing biologised difference in the process. 
Nutrition then becomes a form of moleculer exposure (Landecker 2011). Women and their food choices are 
problematized and targeted, despite the miniscule molecular differences flagged as the endpoint of concern 
and the contention surrounding interpretations of threshold doses. This risk lens not only shifts 
responsibility for managing environmental health and pollution onto childbearing women, it also biologically 
produces race as a physical inferiority transmitted through the generations. As Mansfield suggests: 
A women’s abnormal racialized diet is written on her child’s brain. Suddenly racialized differences 
in intelligence – long one of the key axes of racialization (McWhorter 2009) – become real (368) 
This focus on marking out socially divided cultural practices through patterns in gene expression sustains a 
centuries old preoccupation with sorting and ranking populations according to their deviation from white, 
privileged norms. This is notwithstanding, a deeper historical embedding in the Western socio-religious 
psyche positioning women as responsible for the woes of the world. 
Thus while postgenomic science offers new conceptualisations and possibilities, it is magnetically latching 
onto and reproducing established social orders rather than challenging them. As such, received optimism 
about biosocial potentials risks replicating rather than disrupting the myopia marking previous incarnations. 
The eugenics movement of the last century was characterised by its own hopeful ethos, with improvement 
of the genetic national profile through selective breeding championed by progressive intellectuals including 
feminists, Marxists and social reformers (Rose and Rose 2014). It is not comforting to know that an 
ideology of improvement during this time was so ingrained that the first wave of Nazi atrocities went largely 
unremarked upon in the West (Pichot cited in Rose and Rose 2014).  
 
A handmaidens tale? 
 
In making these points we are not doubting the contribution sociology could make to the research 
frameworks of the life sciences. On the contrary, many of the concerns we have raised highlight the need 
for such collaboration, but in a context where sociological insights and the politics of knowledge are 
reflected upon and taken seriously. Calls to ‘shake up the social sciences’ (Christakis 2013) by mining the 
new frontiers of bioscience can imply a markedly one sided endeavour in which social scientists abandon 
their critical instincts and work to further a natural science agenda (Davies 2014). Social scientists may be 
reluctant to take up a role that, as Pickersgill et al (2013) suggest might be interpreted as ‘handmaiden’ to 
the life scientists. It is also unclear why scientists would look to sociologists to interpret the social above 
social psychologists, with whom they share more intellectual ground. Acknowledgement of and interest in 
the social and emotional within the life sciences is occurring in a distinctly psychologised context in which 
soft skills’, relational competence and empathy are envisaged as strategic techniques to better manage 
social encounters and further self-interest (Illouze 2008). It may be argued that there is nothing inherently 
wrong with this approach. But if the social patterns of domination and oppression traditionally addressed 
within sociology are left unaddressed, the discipline itself risks becoming marginalised (Edwards et al. 
2012). 
 
As we have laid out in this paper there are broader issues at stake than the future of sociology. While the 
social may now be recognised as an essential feature of human functioning at the level of biology, this 
insight is locking into place an individualistic lens of cooperation and negotiation, while displacing 
alternative political visions of solidarity, commonality and belonging. An ethic of self-transformational 
efficiency is rendering the biological social to solidify and make normative particular ways of being. More 
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specifically, a logic of capital demands we become better individuals, obscuring and delegitimising a social 
realm in which interdependence, care, altruism, kindness and humility may be valued above instrumental 
self enhancement. With this vanishing of the social comes a closing down of these other ways of being and 
living. 
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Figure I: ‘Different upbringings’ from Miller (2010) 
 
From Miller, G. (2010) ‘The seductive allure of behavioural epigenetics’, Science, Vol. 329, 2 July, p.25. 
Reprinted with permission from AAAS. 
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